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Politics, government health expenditure and infant mortality: Does political party 
orientation matter?
Abstract
Purpose: Motivated by the scant available evidence we explore the relationship between 
government political party orientation and infant mortality.
Design/methodology/approach: We apply a panel quantile methodology to a dataset that 
consists of 15 countries of the G20 group over the period 2000-2018. We control for 
heterogeneous parameters across countries and quantiles and obtain estimates across the 
different points of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable.
Findings: Our findings support the hypothesis that political party orientation has a significant 
effect on a population health indicator such as infant mortality. The analysis suggests that, to 
a great extent, left-wing government parties contribute to better health outcomes - when 
compared to right and centre political parties - both individually as well as interacted with 
government health expenditure. Moreover, the impact of redistributing policies appears to be 
of a paramount importance in alleviating infant mortality while more education and lower 
unemployment can also contribute to better health outcomes.
Originality: We explore the relationship between the nature of government political party 
orientation (i.e. right, centre and left) and infant mortality whilst at the same time gauging the 
mediating effect of party orientation via government health expenditure on infant mortality. 
Additional aspects of the impact of other control variables such as, income inequality, 
unemployment, and education on infant mortality are also investigated.  
Keywords: health expenditure; infant mortality; panel data
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The literature on the determinants of health outcomes is well developed while there is 
growing evidence about the impact of social and cultural factors on population health. 
However, only scant evidence exists about the impact of government political party 
orientation on health outcomes while the distribution and exercise of power in health policy 
and systems has received little attention (Shiffman, 2014; Lee, 2015). Although several 
empirical studies have explored the potential channels through which the nature of political 
regimes (democratic, autocratic, etc.) affects economic development (e.g., Przeworski et al., 
2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) or health outcomes (e.g. Okada, 2018), studies that 
investigate the impact of government political party orientation on population health have 
fallen behind. Given the nature as well as the composition of current democratic societies one 
would have expected more emphasis to be placed on the policy implications of 
democratically elected political parties on health outcomes. Rudolf Virchow – one of the 
most influential figures in social medicine – eloquently summarized that “Medicine is a 
social science and politics nothing but medicine on a grand scale”.
One possible explanation for the limited literature on the impact of politics on health 
outcomes might relate to the fact that the public health field is mainly dominated by medical 
researchers who consider politics to be controversial or falling outside their remit. An 
alternative explanation might also reside in the way most public health research is funded. 
For instance, Navarro (2008) argues that within the European region most of the funding 
comes from public sources that are closely related to political parties. It would therefore be 
unlikely that an incumbent administration of one political party approves research evidence 
that suggests that parties of the opposite orientation are more effective in improving 
population health.
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Arguably, the exercise of power might indeed be a feature of actors or institutions that 
have the ability to shape global health policy (Brown et al., 2006), but at a national level 
political parties and their concomitant ideologies can be of paramount importance in 
influe cing the equity and universality of public policy (Navarro et al., 2006; Mackenbach, 
2014). It is in this sense that the World Health Organization’s Director-General suggested 
that universal health coverage (UHC) is “a political choice” (UN News 2019; WHO 2019). 
Politics is a ubiquitous feature of modern societies whilst political views and 
economic systems differ markedly. The traditional ideological dichotomy between left-wing 
and right-wing party orientation reflects the degree of government intervention in a market 
system to either secure social goals or provide more economic freedom and minimal state 
intervention. In this context, existing social and economic inequalities are believed to be 
strong predictors of health inequalities whilst increased income inequality is found to 
adversely affect both health and social outcomes - such as infant mortality, life expectancy, 
obesity, mental health, trust, level of education and social mobility (Willkison and Pickett, 
2010). There is also evidence that political orientation in conjunction with personal and 
vested interests can have a substantial impact on health policy (Ferrie, 2015; Reijneveld, 
2017).  
From a policy perspective, the proponents of the view that institutions are closely 
bound up with the evolution of welfare systems suggest that direct democracies, and 
federalism, tend to promote a more liberal type of welfare state by vetoing decisions and by 
steering the central government's direction to the expansion of social expenditure (Immergut, 
1992; Wagschal, 1997; Crepaz, 1998; Lijphart, 2012; Castles, 2000; Tsebelis, 2002). In view 
of the above and the very few studies in the area, such as the one by Korpi (2000) who 
explored how political traditions and the power relations reflected by class as well as gender 
affect the nature of the welfare state and the well-being of the population, we feel that there is 
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a scope and a pressing need to undertake more studies exploring the impact of politics on 
health outcomes. 
In this direction we attempt to contribute to the existing literature in a number of 
ways. First, by applying a panel quantile methodology to a dataset that consists of 15 
countries of the G20 group over the period 2000-2018, we control for heterogeneous 
parameters across countries and quantiles and obtain estimates across the different points of 
the conditional distribution of the health indicator variable. Second, to the best of our 
knowledge this is the first study that explores the relationship between the nature of 
government political party orientation (i.e. right, centre and left) and infant mortality whilst at 
the same time gauges the mediating effect of party orientation via government health 
expenditure on infant mortality. Additional aspects of the impact of other control variables 
such as, income inequality, unemployment, and education on infant mortality are also 
investigated.  
Our findings support the hypothesis that political party orientation affects indicators 
of population health such as infant mortality. Our analysis makes an empirical link between 
politics and policy by showing that to a great extent left-wing parties via health expenditure 
outlays produce better health outcomes compared to right and centre oriented political 
parties. In addition, the impact of redistributing policies (as reflected by the highly significant 
Gini coefficient) appears to be of a paramount importance in alleviating infant mortality 
whilst both education and unemployment incrementally reinforce the hypothesis that more 
education and lower unemployment contribute to better health outcomes. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section presents a 
brief overview of the related literature whilst the third section describes the data and the 
estimation methodology adopted in this study. The fourth section discusses the estimation 
results and the final section provides some concluding remarks.
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The preponderance of the existing health policy and systems analyses are mainly descriptive 
(Adam et al., 2012), lacking theoretical foundations that can generate durable intellectual 
frameworks to analyse health problems in different contexts (Kleinman, 2010), making their 
suggestions “incoherent and difficult to integrate into foreign policy strategies” (Youde, 
2005, p. 205). Gilson and Raphaely (2008) reviewed the policy analysis literature and found 
that a vigorous assessment of politics and power was rarely studied whilst Storeng and 
Mishra (2014) observed that health systems strengthening studies focused on technical and 
managerial issues of health service delivery, whilst no attention was paid to the politics and 
social relations that affect health systems. 
According to the hypothesis of partisan influence on public policy one key factor 
accounting for significant variations in policy outcomes in constitutional democracies is the 
party composition of government (see, Hibbs, 1977; Castles, 1982; Cameron, 1984; Hicks 
and Swank, 1992; Schmidt, 1996; Okada, 2018). In this context, right-wing political parties 
are associated with significantly lower welfare expenditure whilst left-wing parties tend to 
encourage higher welfare spending. 
A report from the World Health Organization (2008) attributed health inequities to a 
toxic environment that nurtures poor social policies, unfair economic arrangements, and bad 
politics. Even though the report conceptualised and collated qualitative evidence on a wide 
range of social forces and casual processes that can potentially affect health i equity, aspects 
on competing political priorities, contested political ideologies, or other factors encountered 
when moving forward health policy agendas, were rather ambiguous (Lee, 2010). In a recent 
report, the World Health Organizations (2018) used the same rhetoric (i.e., that health 
inequities are attributed to factors including education, employment status, income level, 
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gender and ethnicity) without however making an effort to provide clear policy insights 
relating to specific political or ideological persuasion. 
Ottersen et al. (2014) defined the “global political determinants of health as the 
norms, policies, and practices that arise from global interactions among entities (states, 
transnational corporations, and civil society organisations, among others) with different 
interests and degrees of power” (p.630). The existing health reports in the area have to a great 
extent failed to “consider the need to better understand empirically how power is expressed in 
global health governance” (Marten, et al., p. 2207). 
Developing interdisciplinary research that can systematically explore issues relating 
to inequity and political power or generate a decent dialogue between global health 
researchers requires that humanities and social sciences are combined (Ooms, 2014). Despite 
the fact that over the past few years there has been a growing interest in social-scientific 
scholarship on questions of power and politics in global health (Hansen et al., 2013; Storeng 
and Mishra, 2014; Gomez, 2016; Parker and Garcia, 2019), there are voices that are calling 
for political science “to take global health policy issues more seriously, while the global 
public health community needs to do the same for political science, specifically on issues of 
institutional design and governance” (Gomez, 2016, p. 4). 
Despite the fact that extensive theoretical research has been conducted on how 
political traditions affect health policy, hardly any empirical studies have emerged that 
explore the impact of political party orientation on health outcomes. At a policy level, the 
evidence is readily available and as Navarro (2006) argues, parties promoting social policies 
and a fairer distribution of income have been more successful in improving health population 
compared to parties whose policies are devoid of such a commitment. On the empirical front, 
single-country evidence on the health effects of political party orientation (see, McGuire 
2010; Scott-Samuel et al., 2014; Hiam et al., 2017; Watkins et al., 2017) can offer useful 
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insights, but internationally comparative studies can provide a more holistic analysis by 
transcending the specificities of individual countries. Muntaner et al. (2011) explored four 
key political features i.e., democracy, welfare state, left-of-centre political tradition and 
globalisation, and found that a) a democracy may be health-promoting due to the inherent 
ability of the electorate to use their voting power when faced with unpopular policies, b) the 
left-of-centre political tradition is directly associated with a welfare state which promotes 
better health outcomes through policies that reduce social, economic and health inequalities 
(Rowlingson, 2011), and c) globalisation, as this is reflected by the emergence of free-trade 
and neoliberal policies, is advocated by right-wing political entities the policies of which 
exacerbate population health outcomes. In the same spirit, Barnish and Turner (2017) 
concluded that a generous welfare state, left-of-centre democratic political tradition, and 
democracy, appear to be positively affecting population health whilst the evidence on 
globalisation may be less conclusive. 
Moreover, another study using data for various OECD economies governed mainly by 
social democratic parties (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Austria) suggested that 
their commitment to redistributive policies as measured by the average Gini coefficient over 
the last 10 years of the study period (which was 0.22)  (LIS, 2006) provided universal health 
care coverage, and social benefits to all citizens (ranging from 30% of GDP for social public 
expenditure to 7.2% of GDP for the average public health care expenditure over the last 10  
years of the study period). More recent studies suggest that Nordic countries rank high among 
OECD countries in terms of per capita expenditure on health (averaging 10.3% of GDP) 
whereas Austrian health expenditure in 2016 was 10.4% of GDP respectively (OECD 2017; 
Morgan et al. 2017).  In this context, Raphael and Bryant (2004) argue that social democratic 
parties nurture policies that support women’s health and wellbeing, paid maternity leave, 
early child education, childcare, low crime, participation of women in government, and home 
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care services. On the other hand, those economies (i.e., Italy, Netherlands, Germany, Belgium 
and France) that have been less committed to redistributive policies (average Gini coefficient 
of 0.30) than social democrats, have been mainly governed by conservative parties or 
Christian democratic parties for most of the period from 1950 to 2000. Indicatively, the 
average public social expenditure and average public health care expenditure were 28% and 
6.4% of GDP respectively (Bambra, 2005). Recently the average public heath expenditure in 
these countries has increased further registering 8.5% of GDP (Morgan et al, 2017). 
Furthermore, countries mainly run by liberal or conservative parties of a liberal 
persuasion, (such as the UK, Ireland, Canada and the USA) appear to be adopting policies 
that are redistributive in nature (the group average Gini coefficient was 0.32) whilst public 
social expenditures are much lower than in the countries governed by social democratic and 
Christian democratic parties. In particular, average public social expenditure was 24% of 
GDP, whereas the average public health care expenditure amounted to 5.8% of GDP (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). The picture however concerning the respective economies appears to have 
changed dramatically as more recent data suggests that the average health expenditure has 
doubled, reaching 11.6% of GDP (OECD 2017). 
Countries governed for a considerable period of time by conservative dictatorships 
(such as Spain, Portugal Greece) during the period of the study (1950-2000) were 
characterized by unequal income distribution, underdeveloped welfare state and poor public 
services (the average Gini coefficient was 0.42). In these group of countries public social 
expenditures were very low (the average social expenditure at the end of each dictatorship, 
sometime in the 1970s, was only 14% of GDP, and the average public health care 
expenditure was only 4.8% of GDP). It should be stressed however that in the years that 
followed, democracy was established in these countries and their average public social 
expenditure and average public health care expenditure were close to those of the liberal 
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Data and methodology 
We investigate the effects of government health expenditure and government party political 
orientation on health outcomes by estimating an unbalanced panel with annual data for the 
period 2000-2018. We focus on 15 countries of the G20 group1 (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea Republic, Mexico, South Africa, Spain, 
United Kingdom, USA). 
Our baseline regression model is: 
tradition (see, Navarro, 1989, 2002) while more recently health expenditure has amounted to 
8.7% of GDP (Morgan et al. 2017).  
 (1)1 2 3 4 5            it i it it it it it ithealth govhealthex inequality unemployment education X
where health denotes health outcomes captured by infant mortality, govehealthex denotes 
government health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, inequality denotes a Gini index of 
income inequality in equivalized household disposable income developed by Solt (2020), 
unemployment is the unemployment rate, and education is secondary school enrolment.
Equation (1) also includes a vector X that consists of dummy variables that capture 
government party orientation with respect to economic policy which are constructed using 
data from the Database of Political Institutions 2020 (Cruz et al., 2021). Specifically, right is 
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the government party is defined as right 
(conservative, Christian democratic, right-wing) and 0 otherwise (Model 1); centre takes the 
value 1 if the government party position can best be described as Centrist and 0 otherwise 
(Model 3); and left takes the value 1 if the government party is left (communist, socialist, 
social democratic, left-wing) and 0 otherwise (Model 5). Furthermore, by interacting the 
types of political party in power with government health expenditure, we explore the 
1 Our effort to use data for all the G20 countries and a longer time period was hampered by data availability. 
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potential effect that may be manifested through the impact of the interacting terms (Models 2, 
4, 6). Table A1 in the Appendix presents detailed descriptions of all variables and their 
sources, while Tables A2 and A3 provide descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix. 
Traditional regression techniques (e.g. OLS) measure differences in the dependent 
variable between populations at the mean and in this setting the fundamental assumption 
made is that the regression coefficients are constant across the population. However, in some 
cases we are interested to investigate if the independent variables have varying effects at 
different points in the conditional distribution of the dependent variable, rather than only at 
the mean. This is important in our context since it is reasonable to expect that the effect of 
government health expenditure may differ across quantiles of the conditional distribution of 
the health outcome variable. To this end, we employ a quantile panel estimator with 
nonadditive fixed effects which produces estimates at different points of the conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable which are considered to be more robust to nonnormal 
errors and outliers. 
Many panel quantile estimators include additive fixed effects in the quantile function 
and provide estimates about the distribution of (𝑌𝑖𝑡 ― 𝜇𝑖│𝑍𝑖𝑡), where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the outcome 
variable, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 are treatment variables (exogenous or endogenous), and 𝜇𝑖 denotes the fixed 
effects. However, observations at the top of  (𝑌𝑖𝑡 ― 𝜇𝑖), may actually be at the bottom of the 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 distribution and, subsequently, additive fixed effect models can provide information about 
the outcome relative to fixed effect distribution rather than the effects of the treatment 
variables on the outcome distribution. In this paper we employ Powell’s (2016) panel data 
quantile estimator with nonadditive fixed effects that provides estimates for the distribution 
(𝑌𝑖𝑡│𝑍𝑖𝑡) , while allowing for individual level heterogeneity and maintaining the non- of  
separable disturbance term typically used in quantile estimation. The quantile panel estimator 
with nonadditive fixed effects produces estimates which are consistent for small T and can be 
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Results and discussion 
We use infant mortality as a proxy for health outcomes and as implied by the quantile 
methodology adopted, we estimate alternative models at different point of the distribution 
(0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90). In Models 1, 3, and 5 (Tables 1, 2, 3) the four control variables 
are common in all models whilst the party orientation dummies are inserted one at a time. In 
Models 2, 4, and 6 we use the same rationale as previously but this time the party dummy 
variables are interacted with government health expenditure in order to capture the mediating 
effect of party orientation through government health expenditure on infant mortality. 
[Tables 1, 2, 3 about here] 
The results indicate that a first key finding is the paramount and highly significant 
role that government health expenditure, income inequality, and party orientation play in 
affecting infant mortality. More specifically, the empirical results show that the relationship 
between government health expenditure (govhealthex) and infant mortality is robust and 
statistically significant with varying degrees of negative impact across the five quantiles for 
each of the models estimated. Our results suggest that at least for the set of counties in our 
sample, effective allocation of government health expenditure will indeed reduce infant 
mortality a finding in line with Rana et al. (2018), Nicholas et al. (2016), Rahman et al. 
(2018) and Owusu et al. (2019) but inconsistent with the study of Akinlo and Sulola (2019). 
Income inequality (inequality) is found to be positive and highly significant across all 
estimated models and different points of the distribution which is in line with Kawachi and 
Kennedy (1999) who argue that redistributive economic policies have a substantial impact on 
social justice and better population health. The proposition that income distribution plays a 
interpreted in the same manner as cross-sectional quantile estimates, i.e. the impact of the 
explanatory variables on a quantile of the outcome distribution. 
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key role in determining population’s health, is also explored by Mellor and Milyo (2002), 
Osler et al. (2002), Shibuya et al. (2002); Deaton and Lubotsky (2003), Lynch et al. (2004), 
Leigh et al. (2012), Pickett and Wilkinson (2015), Neumayer and Plumper (2016), amongst 
others. It is therefore envisaged that the countries where policies distribute income more 
equitably will be boasting a heathier population. 
Unemployment is found to have a positive effect across the majority of the estimated 
models which is in line with Adofu and Salami (2019). It is worth noting here that the 
broader literature on unemployment proxied by economic downturns and child health has 
produced mixed evidence (see for instance, Dehejia and Lleras-Muney 2004 and Eiríksdóttir 
et al. 2013. Furthermore, education has a significantly negative effect however this finding is 
relatively difficult to be compared against existing studies on the relationship between 
education and infant mortality as the majority, if not all of these, use survey data that consists 
of various socio-economic factors such as mother's education, mother's work status, 
husband's occupation, husband's education, type of place of residence etc. The level of 
mother's education in a number of this these studies is particularly strongly associated with 
infant mortality whilst in some others it is the husband's education that is more important 
(Hobcraft et al., 1984; Arntzen and Andersen, 2004; Gakidou et al., 2010; Andriano et al., 
2019). 
The party orientation dummies exhibit interesting patterns when they are examined 
individually or as interaction terms with government health expenditure. In particular, the 
party right dummy (right) when considered individually appears to be initially negatively 
related to infant mortality at the 0.10 and 0.25 quantiles respectively, then turns positive and 
significant at the 0.5 quantile before it becomes again negative and significant at the 0.75 
quantile (Table 1, Model 1). When the party interactions are considered, the coefficient of the 
party right interaction (right×govhealthex) is negative and significant at the lowest quantile 
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0.10 which then changes to positive at quantiles 0.50 and 0.75 (Table 1, Model 2). The party 
centre dummy (centre) is found to be positive and significant at the first two quantiles 0.10 
and 0.25 before it turns negative at quantiles 0.50 and 0.90 (Table 2, Model 3). The estimates 
for the interaction term (centre×govhealthex) are more fragmented since it is found to be 
negative and highly significant only at the 0.50 quantile (Table 2, Model 4). The party left 
dummy (left) is found to be positive and significant at the lowest quantile 0.10 before it 
becomes negative and highly significant at the following three quantiles 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 
(Table 3, Model 5) while the results of the interaction term (left×govhealthex) are mostly 
consistent; positive and significant at the lowest quantile 0.10 and change to negative and 
significant at the following quantiles 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 (Table 3, Model 6). 
Our results to a great extent confirm the view that left-wing governments promote, 
through health expenditure provision, better health outcomes than under right-wing 
governments. This is evident in the highly significant coefficients of the individual left party 
dummy as well as the interaction term in the respective quantiles (0.25, 0.50, 0.75). In this 
context, infant mortality may be influenced by leftist political orientation as they tend to 
support policies that favour the weakest and disadvantaged of the populations (Subramanian 
et al., 2009). The fact however that at the lowest quantile 0.10 the interaction term was found 
to positively affect infant mortality might suggest that certain segments of the society will not 
benefit from higher spending. Even though it might not directly follow from our results it 
might be inferred that people at the lowest end of the distribution are unable to strike a 
balance between individual lifestyle choices versus wider structural factors that shapes their 
health outcome, hence, being unable to harness the benefits of higher health expenditure. 
Overall, the policy implications of our study are of great significance as it raises 
awareness of the fact that politics do matter and should therefore assume prominence in 
public health research. It is impossible to understand health outcomes without acknowledging 
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the ideological differences between governments. Our study clearly suggests that state 
administrations, such as left-wing governments, that favour redistributional policies (through 
more progressive tax systems and universal welfare cultures) are more likely to be associated 
with improved population health outcomes such as lower rates of infant mortality. Policy 
makers need to understand that the assumption that democratic systems serve as an automatic 
remedy of ailments, is mostly a misconception. Infant mortality can only be reduced by the 
right mix of gover ment policies. Well-designed policies that aim at boosting social and 
health expenditure should be envisaged as the precursors of improved health outcomes. 
Conclusions
Arguably, government healthcare expenditure is one of the most important components of 
total government expenditure in advanced economies and potentially one of the most 
controversial topics in the political discourse. The notion that partisan ideology is associated 
with changes in health expenditure in the OECD (Herwartz and Theilen, 2014) provided the 
impetus for this study to assess its mediating effect on health outcomes. 
Research on the social determinants of health (Braveman et al., 2011) has highlighted 
how environmental and societal factors can shape health outcomes. Insights into the 
institutional aspects of racism and discrimination and their concomitant impact on health 
disparities have also been provided (Bailey et al., 2017). In this study we have gone one step 
further by assessing the political determinants of health as an important, but currently under-
researched, determinant of health. We have explored the relationship betwee  the 
government political party orientation and health outcomes (as proxied by infant mortality) 
and gauged the mediating effect of party policy via government health outlays on infant 
mortality. Additional aspects potentially significant for health outcomes such as income 
inequality, unemployment, and education were also investigated.
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Our findings support the hypothesis that political party orientation affects indicators 
of population health outcomes such as infant mortality. We find that left-wing parties, when 
compared to right and centre oriented political parties, contribute to better health outcomes.  
In addition, the impact of redistributing policies (as reflected by the highly significant Gini 
coefficient) appears to be of a paramount importance in alleviating infant mortality whilst 
both education and unemployment incrementally reinforce the premise that more education 
and lower unemployment can lead to better health outcomes. 
Setting priorities for health spending has been at the forefront of research for decades 
and health policy researchers have been trying to come up with the proper formula that could 
be used to effectively plan health care expenditure policies. Despite the existing limitations 
that relate to the measures of burden - that emphasize mortality or health expenditure - it is 
apparent that no formulas or broad principles can be used in lieu of a political process when 
determining priorities in health care expenditure. When it comes to which party ideology 
favours a more equitable and healthy society, left-wing ideology appears to dominate the 
theoretical we well as empirical discourse of academic analysis. The question, however, is 
not to get entangled into party politics that most of the time are dominated by vested interests 
but rather to devise a political process that is not dominated by those with greater wealth and 
position of power. We should find a way to a process that is fair and transparent given the 
history of health policy across the world.
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Table 1. Panel quantile results for right government party policy orientation
Model 1
Quantile 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
govhealthex -0.297*** -0.444*** -0.474** -0.356*** -2.839***
 (0.078) (0.032) (0.238) (0.089) (0.778)
inequality 0.844*** 0.753*** 0.708*** 0.582*** 0.850***
 (0.045) (0.009) (0.027) (0.046) (0.092)
unemployment 0.002 0.080*** 0.197*** 0.691*** 0.098***
 (0.031) (0.006) (0.052) (0.044) (0.019)
education -0.069*** -0.085*** -0.076*** -0.255*** 0.073
 (0.021) (0.005) (0.022) (0.018) (0.118)
right -0.611** -0.675*** 0.674** -0.734*** 0.905
 (0.242) (0.146) (0.287) (0.137) (0.657)
Model 2
Quantile 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
govhealthex -0.481*** -0.336*** -0.312*** -0.234*** -2.685***
 (0.042) (0.106) (0.068) (0.049) (0.354)
inequality 0.809*** 0.700*** 0.676*** 0.800*** 0.721***
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.029) (0.009) (0.099)
unemployment -0.011 -0.072 0.160*** 0.541*** 0.326**
 (0.059) (0.095) (0.025) (0.024) (0.141)
education -0.075*** -0.050 -0.092*** -0.134*** -0.031
 (0.011) (0.048) (0.006) (0.004) (0.044)
right×govhealthex -0.135*** -0.020 0.100*** 0.052*** 0.100
(0.021) (0.048) (0.019) (0.007) (0.099)
Notes: 206 observations in total. Standard errors in parentheses. The adaptive Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo optimization procedure is employed with 1000 draws. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2. Panel quantile results for centre government party policy orientation
Model 3
Quantile 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
govhealthex -0.519*** -0.381*** -1.178* -0.531*** -2.493***
 (0.067) (0.033) (0.614) (0.073) (0.190)
inequality 0.781*** 0.819*** 0.608*** 0.755*** 0.765***
 (0.033) (0.007) (0.074) (0.013) (0.053)
unemployment -0.010 -0.003 0.392* 0.523*** 0.053
 (0.066) (0.011) (0.225) (0.009) (0.047)
education -0.087*** -0.050*** -0.097*** -0.116*** -0.151***
 (0.015) (0.005) (0.018) (0.003) (0.010)
centre 0.980*** 0.854*** -1.337** 0.756 -13.386***
(0.217) (0.224) (0.663) (0.759) (1.164)
Model 4
Quantile 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
govhealthex -0.499*** -0.553*** -0.419*** -1.503** -2.465***
 (0.147) (0.040) (0.155) (0.604) (0.646)
inequality 0.659*** 0.799*** 0.686*** 1.163*** 0.796***
 (0.089) (0.017) (0.038) (0.199) (0.159)
unemployment -0.020 -0.004 0.124* 0.110 0.280
 (0.054) (0.043) (0.065) (0.180) (0.193)
education -0.083*** -0.018 -0.104*** 0.059 0.012
 (0.021) (0.027) (0.007) (0.088) (0.076)
cenrte×govhealthex 0.194 -0.115* -0.369*** -0.270 0.495
(0.148) (0.059) (0.040) (0.948) (1.852)
Notes: See notes Table 1
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Table 3. Panel quantile results for left government party policy orientation
Model 5
Quantile 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
govhealthex -0.453*** -0.019 -0.481*** -0.119*** -2.299***
 (0.095) (0.080) (0.153) (0.030) (0.816)
inequality 0.869*** 0.797*** 0.774*** 0.826*** 0.828***
 (0.043) (0.021) (0.064) (0.005) (0.148)
unemployment 0.011 -0.039*** 0.372*** 0.424*** 0.165
 (0.039) (0.011) (0.128) (0.010) (0.194)
education -0.078*** -0.089*** -0.025 -0.131*** -0.012
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.038) (0.003) (0.074)
left 0.807*** -0.766*** -0.960** -0.083** -0.320
(0.231) (0.216) (0.455) (0.039) (0.738)
Model 6
Quantile 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
govhealthex -0.603*** 0.062 -0.123*** -0.155*** -1.687***
 (0.033) (0.115) (0.037) (0.009) (0.325)
inequality 0.807*** 0.923*** 0.697*** 0.830*** 1.229***
 (0.013) (0.050) (0.011) (0.002) (0.221)
unemployment -0.020 -0.102* 0.155*** 0.459*** -0.073
 (0.032) (0.057) (0.018) (0.008) (0.167)
education -0.089*** -0.059** -0.093*** -0.135*** 0.106
 (0.003) (0.025) (0.004) (0.002) (0.122)
left×govhealthex 0.100*** -0.077** -0.081*** -0.029*** 0.031
(0.015) (0.035) (0.010) (0.008) (0.100)
Notes: See notes Table 1
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Table A1. Description of variables
Variable Definition Source
health Infant mortality rate is the number of infants 
dying before reaching one year of age per 
1,000 live births.
World Development Indicators
govhealthex General government health expenditure from 
domestic sources (% of GDP).
World Development Indicators
inequality Gini index of inequality based on household 
disposable (post-tax, post-transfer) income.
Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database 9.0 (Solt, 
2020)
unemployment Unemployment (% of total labour force). World Development Indicators
education School enrolment, secondary (% gross). World Development Indicators
right Government party economic policy orientation 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
government party is right (conservative, 
Christian democratic, right-wing) and 0 
otherwise.
Constructed by the authors 
using data from the Database of 
Political Institutions 2020 (Cruz 
et al., 2021)
centre Government party economic policy orientation 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
government party ca  be described as Centrist 
and 0 otherwise.
Constructed by the authors 
using data from the Database of 
Political Institutions 2020 (Cruz 
et al., 2021)
left Government party economic policy orientation 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
government party is left (communist, socialist, 
social democratic, left-wing) and 0 otherwise.
Constructed by the authors 
using data from the Database of 
Political Institutions 2020 (Cruz 
et al., 2021)
Table A2. Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
health 285 11.71 13.91 1.80 66.70
govhealthex 285 5.52 2.27 0.71 9.21
inequality 275 37.79 9.43 26.20 63.50
unemployment 267 8.75 6.43 2.40 33.29
education 233 98.59 16.0 44.87 157.20
right 268 0.478 0.50 0 1
centre 268 0.082 0.27 0 1
left 268 0.440 0.49 0 1
Table A3. Correlation matrix
Variable health govhealthex inequality unemployment education
health 1.00
govhealthex -0.66 1.00
inequality 0.88 -0.63 1.00
unemployment 0.49 -0.12 0.57 1.00
education -0.59 0.51 -0.43 0.09 1.00
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